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LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND THE
PRACTICE OF LAW
ROBERT POST*
Very few academics today doubt that American legal scholarship
is experiencing a crisis of identity. We are torn between the project of
professional education and the aspiration for more general academic
respectability; we veer unstably between celebrating the rule of law
and deconstructing it in the most advanced postmodern fashion; we
are ripped apart by divergent currents of Critical Legal Studies, Her-
meneutic Theory, clinical education, Doctrinalism, Law and Econom-
ics, Feminism, Critical Race Theory, Positivism, Law and Literature,
or, most recently, anti-normativism. We are in danger of dissipating
our coherence as a professional discipline.
There are in my view two primary causes for the current chaos.
Both are visible in the three papers about which I have been asked to
comment. The first is the emergence of a form of legal scholarship
that situates itself exogenously to the practice of law. This is the
scholarship championed in the excellent paper by Meir Dan-Cohen.I
The second is a growing uncertainty about the purposes of legal prac-
tice, an uncertainty that is increasingly paralyzing to those legal aca-
demics who sincerely seek to improve the practice. This paralysis is
apparent in the fine papers of John Henry Schlegel2 and Robert Weis-
berg,3 which well display the demoralization of contemporary legal
scholarship.
These two causes have in common the concept of a social "prac-
tice." The concept is essential to understanding the present state of
American legal scholarship, and so it is necessary to explore it in some
detail. Following the work of the philosopher Alasdair Maclntyre, I
shall define a practice as:
[A]ny coherent and complex form of socially established coopera-
tive human activity through which goods internal to that form of
activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those stan-
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1. Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eavesdroppers: The Audience for Substantive Legal Theory, 63
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dards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially defini-
tive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods
involved, are systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an exam-
ple of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with skill;
but the game of football is, and so is chess. Bricklaying is not a
practice; architecture is.'
I hope it is clear that law, as an institution inhabited by judges and
lawyers, is a "practice" in this sense.' Law is a coherent and complex
cooperative form of human activity that contains within it standards
of excellence. Lawyers and judges attempt to excel in the law, and
when they have done so they experience that special sense of accom-
plishment-which MacIntyre calls an "internal good" 6-that can only
arise from having excelled within a practice.
MacIntyre makes a very important point about practices. He
tells us:
A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to
rules .... To enter a practice is to accept the authority of those
standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged
by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences
and tastes to the standards which currently and partially define the
practice .... [T]he standards are not themselves immune from
criticism, but none the less we cannot be initiated into a practice
without accepting the authority of the best standards realised so
far. If, on starting to listen to music, I do not accept my own
incapacity to judge correctly, I will never learn to hear, let alone to
appreciate, Bartok's last quartets.7
Practices subsist because of ongoing and shared standards about what
is appropriate for the practice. These standards are often controver-
4. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE 175 (1981).
5. For an excellent discussion, see Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Practice, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 575
(1990) (book review).
6. MacIntyre writes:
There are . . . two kinds of good possibly to be gained by [the practice of] playing
chess. On the one hand there are those goods externally and contingently attached to
chess-playing and to other practices by the accidents of social circumstance... such goods
as prestige, status and money. There are always alternative ways for achieving such goods,
and their achievement is never to be had only by engaging in some particular kind of prac-
tice. On the other hand there are the goods internal to the practice of chess which cannot
be had in any way but by playing chess or some other game of that specific kind. We call
them internal for two reasons: first, as I have already suggested, because we can only specify
them in terms of chess or some other game of that specific kind and by means of examples
from such games... ; and secondly because they can only be identified and recognised by
the experience of participating in the practice in question. Those who lack the relevant
experience are incompetent thereby as judges of internal goods.
MACINTYRE, supra note 4, at 176.
7. Id. at 177.
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sial,' but arguments for their alteration will differ fundamentally de-
pending upon whether they are made within the practice-that is,
whether they appeal to the tacit understandings and purposes of the
practice-or, whether they are made outside of the practice-that is,
whether they make no such appeal.
In Law's Empire, Ronald Dworkin conveys a useful image of
"legal practice" as essentially "argumentative." 9 Dworkin writes that
"[e]very actor in the practice understands that what it permits or re-
quires depends on the truth of certain propositions that are given sense
only by and within the practice; the practice consists in large part in
deploying and arguing about these propositions.' 0 Dworkin con-
trasts "the external point of view of the sociologist or historian, who
asks why certain patterns of legal argument develop in some periods or
circumstances rather than others," with "the internal point of view of
those who make the claims."' 1 The internal point of view is always
framed by a concern for the achievement of the proper purposes of
legal practice; the external point of view, in contrast, has no such
frame. It carries within it instead the distinct purposes of whatever
practice the speaker brings to bear, whether that of history, econom-
ics, or anthropology.
This distinction between internal and external perspectives on the
practice of law 2 is different from the distinction between the presence
or absence of the law's "autonomy as a discipline" evoked by Richard
8. On this point I quite disagree with the thrust of Schlegel's observation that "to understand a
practice only in one's fingers is to leave one with no purchase on, no distance from, that practice and
thus no way to criticize it, except from within its premises (a notoriously limited enterprise)." Schlegel,
supra note 2, at 606. That a pianist learns her craft "in her fingers" does not prevent her from vigor-
ously disputing the proper interpretation of a Chopin nocturne. Such a dispute is not "notoriously
limited" in any sense except that it is "only" about how properly to play the piano. Any reasonably
complex and living practice will contain within itself the resources for sharp and fundamental disputa-
tions. See MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987). That is certainly
true of the practice of law.
9. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 13 (1986).
10. Id.
I1. Id.
12. It has been astutely observed that this distinction is essentially "constantive" and "performa-
tive" in nature. Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 917-26
(1991). Like any judgment, the distinction between the external and internal perspectives on law "im-
plies a community that supplies common grounds or criteria by which one attempts to decide." RON-
ALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGEMENT 143 (1983). Thus those invoking the distinction simultaneously
define and instantiate the relevant community engaged in the practice of law. See generally Robert C.
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 649-67 (1990). This observation, however, does
not discredit or undermine the distinction, but rather records one of the important ways in which
practices (like communities) subsist through forms of communicative action.
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Posner. 13 For Posner the law is autonomous insofar as its proper
practice depends upon specifically legal materials like "judicial opin-
ions, statutes, and rules."' 4 Posner believes that the law should not be
autonomous, because its proper practice should also include "the
methods of scientific and humanistic inquiry to enlarge our knowledge
of the legal system."' 5 Posner makes this claim, however, as one that
is internal to the practice of law. He is not arguing that the practice of
law should be abandoned, but rather that it should be expanded to
include non-legal materials. Having mastered the internal standards
of the practice, Posner advocates their revision.
In this stance Posner represents the traditional relationship be-
tween legal academics and the practice of law. Since the origins of
legal academia in the late 19th century, legal scholars have almost al-
ways situated themselves as internal participants in the practice of law,
taking as their task its refinement and improvement. This was true
even of the legal realists, who, like Posner, believed that legal practice
could be improved through the incorporation of non-legal insights.' 6
I.
This conclusion sets me somewhat apart from Meir Dan-Cohen's
apparent claim that practitioners and academics cannot, as a theoreti-
cal matter, share a common discourse. It is true, of course, that
judges, lawyers, and academics are each differently situated within the
practice of law. But we can draw a telling analogy to the theatrical
profession evoked by Dan-Cohen, in which actors, directors, and play-
wrights have distinctly different roles and perspectives and yet are
each dedicated to the common practice of the theatre and to the goal
of producing excellent plays. Lawyers, judges, and academics have
similarly differentiated roles, and yet are each dedicated to the com-
mon practice of law and to the attainment of excellence within the
law. Certainly the traditional professional task of legal scholarship
has been the improvement and clarification of that practice, bringing
to bear a unique freedom of speculation and leisure for comprehensive
and careful analysis.
Dan-Cohen writes that "the theorist cannot address the practi-
tioner without thereby losing the purity of her own communicative
13. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 761 (1987).
14. Id. at 771.
15. Id. at 779.
16. For exemplary summaries, see Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llew-
ellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARv. L. REV. 465, 493 (1987); Richard W. Jennings, Mr. Justice
Douglas: His Influence on Corporate and Securities Regulation, 73 YALE L. J. 920, 928-29 (1964).
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action and lapsing into strategic communication herself."I 7 But this
point rests on a distinction between "strategic communication" and
"communicative action"1" that is itself relative to the boundary of a
relevant practice. The question of whether we view an expression as
strategic or as non-strategic depends upon whether the expression con-
forms to the standards of the pertinent practice.
Thus Dan-Cohen observes: "In strategic communication... par-
ticipants are oriented toward success; they have a specific goal deter-
mined antecedently to their discursive behavior that the latter is
designed to promote."'' 9 But the definition of a given practice deter-
mines which goals comprise the discursive behavior in question, and
which goals are apart from and "antecedent" to that behavior. So, for
example, a playwright may have the strategic goal of entertaining her
audience, but because this goal is itself part of the professional practice
of dramaturgy, it becomes part of the relevant communicative action
of the play. Similarly, the goal of the trial judge may be to create
durable forms of social order, or to influence the development of law
in other jurisdictions, but these goals are part of the communicative
action of judging because they comprise the very standards by which
excellent judging is assessed.
If the distinction between strategic and non-strategic communica-
tion tracks the difference between communicative goals that are exoge-
nous from and internal to the relevant practice,2 0 the fundamental
issue must be the definition of the relevant practice.2 It follows from
this analysis that Dan-Cohen has not established that legal practition-
ers and legal academics cannot in principle inhabit a common practice
of law; such a conclusion would in any event have been suspect given
the established historical identification of legal academics with legal
practice.22 It also follows, however, that if academics and legal practi-
17. Dan-Cohen, supra note 1, at 587.
18. Id. at 575.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. The definition of a practice, which is to say its standards, are of course always and everywhere
potentially controversial. The distinction between strategic communication and communicative action
often forms part of the vocabulary of such controversies. Thus those who believe that the practice of
legal scholarship should be dispassionate and detached argue that the current appeal to narrativity is an
inappropriate "strategic" effort to emotionally coerce certain reader reactions. But the appeal can
equally well be read as a form of communicative action designed to change the standards of the practice
of scholarship.
21. The same conclusion may be said to apply to Dan-Cohen's other variables of role-detachment
and sincerity. The question of whether Laurence Olivier is "sincere" during his portrayal of Othello
cannot be coherently addressed independent of some understanding of the norms of the practice of
acting. And the same is true of the sincerity of the lawyer in his practice of law. This is true because
almost all successful practices require that their practitioners internalize relevant standards.
22. Dan-Cohen has elsewhere recognized this identification, criticising the work of" 'academic
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tioners in fact inhabit distinct practices, Dan-Cohen has identified sig-
nificant barriers to their mutual communication.
One can interpret Dan-Cohen's paper, therefore, to rest on the
claim that legal academics ought to engage in a practice that is distinct
from the practice of law. Dan-Cohen's invocation of the ideas of
Habermas might thus be read as conveying the aspiration that legal
academia conform to the usual standards of traditional humanistic
scholarship. From the detached perspective of that scholarship, the
practice of the law does appear to be merely strategic and hence con-
tradictory to the scholarly enterprise.
Seen from this angle, Dan-Cohen's paper represents a rigorous
accounting of the deep theoretical implications of the emergence
within the past fifteen years of a form of legal scholarship that is self-
consciously external to the practice of law and that takes its bearings
instead from traditional academic pursuits. For convenience, I shall
call this "external scholarship." Dan-Cohen's argument reveals the
fundamental theoretical reorientation required by such external schol-
arship. And John Henry Schlegel's paper suggests how very hostile
the general law school community is to such scholarship. Schlegel
records the "monotonous and depressing"23 fact that newer forms of
scholarship appear to survive only as they can be assimilated to the
traditional legal practice of rule interpretation. He notes that the cri-
terion for successful legal scholarship is whether it will "be useful to
an appellate judge."24
The work of Dan-Cohen and Schlegel displays one source of the
present crisis of the legal academy. Traditionally allied in the strong-
est fashion with the internal practice of law, law schools are now for
the first time seriously tempted by forms of scholarship that are exter-
nal to that practice. This temptation is reinforced by the increasing
tendency of law schools to hire entry-level professors with no experi-
ence in the actual practice of law, but with advanced degrees in non-
legal areas of scholarship.
A candid appraisal of the current state of legal academia reveals
many severe institutional difficulties that might obstruct the growth of
serious external scholarship. The model for such scholarship may of
course be found in traditional disciplines like anthropology, philoso-
phy, political science, sociology, and so forth. The success of these
disciplines rests upon obvious structural foundations. They have his-
lawyers'. . . who view themselves as participating in essentially the same enterprise as practitioners and
judges, and use very similar methods to theirs." MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANI-
ZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 1 (1986).
23. Schlegel, supra note 2, at 611.
24. Id. at 613.
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torically established standards of scholarly evaluation; they support
publications that are policed through mechanisms of peer review to
ensure the application of these standards; they have rigorous programs
of scholarly training; they recruit new professors based upon actual
scholarly achievement in the form of doctoral dissertations.
Law schools, which have traditionally relied on their close con-
nections to legal practice to discipline their scholarly enterprise, have
none of these basic institutional mechanisms. Law schools do not
train students to be scholars. Law schools tend to hire new recruits on
the basis of law school grades rather than scholarly accomplishment.
Law schools have no historically established standards to measure
achievement in the area of external scholarship, as the notorious and
contentious tenure battles of the past decade have made painfully ap-
parent. Major publications in the area of legal scholarship are policed
by students, who are bright but not yet competent to articulate and
apply scholarly standards, particularly new and contestable ones.
The result is unfortunately predictable. Instead of the elegant
and endless conversation envisioned by Dan-Cohen, we have a tower
of babel: profuse, exhilarating, insufferable. As Schlegel accurately
points out, we never seem to get anywhere. If we in the legal academy
wish seriously to engage in the project of external scholarship, we
ought systematically to set about the business of creating the struc-
tural conditions necessary for such scholarship to flourish.
II.
It is questionable, however, whether legal scholars do in fact wish
to engage in that project. I agree with Schlegel that the vast majority
of legal academics remain committed to their traditionally internal
connection to the practice of law. They would be most unhappy with
Dan-Cohen's strict deduction that law students, insofar as they
wanted to become lawyers, can be educated only in their capacity as
"eavesdroppers" on the scholarly work of their professorate.25 Cer-
tainly Schlegel himself would appear to reject this conclusion. He
writes that the true measure of legal education ought to be the facilita-
tion of "an honorable professional life."26 He thus seems to be arguing
for a better form of practice, one that would be liberated from "the
25. Not to mention, of course, the probable effect which the professional reorientation advocated
by Dan-Cohen would have on the privileged status of law schools. That status flows from the fact that
law schools train lawyers. To the extent that this function is diminished, even in the pursuit of Dan-
Cohen's more vaguely defined project of "education," it is foreseeable that the privileges of law schools
will correspondingly suffer. Most law professors are not likely to welcome this consequence.
26. Schlegel, supra note 2, at 607.
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silly notion of law as rule"27 and that would incorporate nondoctrinal
insights into the "many things other than legal rules [that] interact to
produce results.",
28
But it is difficult to remain content with this simple interpretation
of Schlegel. Scholarship internal to the practice of law must ulti-
mately revolve around the purposes of that practice, which tradition-
ally have been understood in terms of the realization of the rule of law.
Schlegel definitively rejects his understanding of this ideal, forcefully
repudiating its purported equation between "THE LAW" and "THE
RULE."'29 Insofar as Schlegel desires his scholarship to retain an in-
ternal relationship to the practice of law, therefore, he must conjure a
different standard of excellence for that practice. He must offer crite-
ria for determining whether that practice is functioning well or badly.
But Schlegel precisely refuses to accept this responsibility. He
tells us nothing about how, apart from the rule of law, the law ought
to be practiced. And when he must commit himself to a positive cur-
riculum for "the school in [his] mind's eye," 3 ° he can only appeal to
scholarship explicitly devoted to studying legal formations from
purely external, anthropological perspectives.31 Schlegel devastates
contemporary understandings of the practice of law, but leaves noth-
ing standing in their place. The result is the intellectual equivalent of
a scorched earth policy: The practice is savaged from within.
The stance of Schlegel's paper is thus highly ambiguous. The pa-
per claims to be located within the practice of law and to be addressed
to the improvement of that practice. But the paper refuses to accept
the responsibilities necessarily incumbent upon such a location, and it
also warmly embraces various forms of external scholarship. As a
consequence Schlegel seems paralyzed, half in and half out of the
traditional legal academy. He appears unwilling to disgorge either the
prerogatives of legal practice or the delights of external scholarship.
The self-defeating tension of Schlegel's position is an increasingly com-
mon characteristic of bright, innovative legal scholarship.
3 2
III.
If Schlegel is consumed with revulsion at the traditional practice
of law, Robert Weisberg is merely demoralized. Weisberg comprehen-
27. Id. at 608.
28. Id. at 610.
29. Id. at 609.
30. Id. at 614.
31. Id. at 603-05.
32. For discussion of another example, see Robert Post, Post-Modernism and the Law, LONDON
REVIEW OF BooKs, Feb. 21, 1991, at 3, 5 (book review).
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sively notes the difficulties and deficiencies of the contemporary prac-
tice of criminal law and procedure. He excoriates the formulaic,
lifeless quality of current criminal law scholarship. He does not, how-
ever, despair, but instead initiates a search for forms of external exper-
tise and insight by which criminal law and scholarship might be
resuscitated.
His search lies in the grand tradition of progressive legal scholar-
ship, which throughout most of this century has attempted to meet
Brandeis's 1916 challenge to assemble the "necessary knowledge of
economic and social science" for the law "to meet contemporary eco-
nomic and social demands."" Weisberg's quest ultimately leads him
to conclude that "the hope for ... criminal law scholarship" must lie
in "some combination of ethnography and social theory that is willing
to see criminal law as well as crime as observable social data."
'34
Weisberg thus firmly ties legal scholarship to legal practice. If
Dan-Cohen attempts sharply to divide the former from the latter, if
Schlegel hangs agonizingly suspended between the two, Weisberg af-
firms the established enterprise of the legal scholar to clarify and im-
prove the practice of law. He adopts a stance within that practice,
hoping to find the means to reform it. He confidently surveys and
evaluates existing scholarly projects, forcefully demonstrating their in-
adequacy. But when his attention turns toward the necessary task of
articulating a positive vision of the function of criminal law and crimi-
nal law scholarship, his tone changes to one of detachment and disillu-
sion that is distinctly new and modern. Earlier generations of scholars
wielded critical insight in the palpable conviction of actual legal im-
provement. But Weisberg displays no such conviction. His paper al-
most seems to be going through the motions, as though Weisberg were
bound by duty to carefully and comprehensively canvas the academic
scene, but without any real expectation of succor.
A close reading of the paper reveals the source of this malaise.
Weisberg repeatedly circles back to questions of what he calls "episte-
mology," by which he initially means the question of what "does crim-
inal law scholarship study,"3 but by which he means at the end of his
paper the question of what we want to achieve through the criminal
law.36 These questions are genuine and passionately experienced; they
are, given Weisberg's internal stance, mutually entailing. In them we
can discern the second source of the crisis of the traditional legal aca-
33. Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 316, 325 (Osmond K.
Fraenkel ed., 1934).
34. Weisberg, supra note 3, at 568.
35. Id. at 528.
36. Id. at 549-50, 568.
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demic enterprise: The loss of any firm sense of the internal purposes
and function of the practice of law. Because Weisberg is uncertain
what he wants to achieve through criminal law, his writing lacks con-
viction about how to clarify or improve it. He remains stuck attempt-
ing to locate first principles, a scholarly position increasingly familiar
to those who follow closely the contents of contemporary legal
publications.
IV.
The current crisis in legal academia is thus proceeding simultane-
ously on two fronts. Traditional legal scholarship is being challenged
on the one side by the emergence of a new form of external scholar-
ship, and it is being undermined on the other by the collapse of any
internal consensus as to the purposes and function of law. Of these it
is the second that is the more pervasive and corrosive, for it touches, in
one degree or another,. the work of all sensitive and aware legal aca-
demics. Its effects can vary from a mild unease, to the demoralization
of Weisberg, to the outright paralysis of Schlegel.
The causes of this internal crisis are no doubt extensive and com-
plex. One important cause, however, is almost certainly the deteriora-
tion of legal authority. The law has traditionally understood its
authority as founded in the rule of law,37 which has embodied the val-
ues of universality and impersonality. But as we have come to see the
law as itself a culturally specific form of discourse,38 and as we have
come to see culture as increasingly splintered and heterogeneous, legal
authority and the rule of law have grown correspondingly problem-
atic. In a world where value is socially constructed, the old aspira-
tions for universality and impersonality can no longer be taken for
granted, for their meaning must be attributed to one or another of the
many cultures competing for control of the law. It is unclear what
impersonal, universal, or authoritative ground the law can assume in
this landscape of cultural diversity and division.
The search for this ground represents a formidable task in today's
contentious atmosphere. It is far easier to abandon the search, side-
step the internal problem of legal authority, and shift one's orientation
to the external perspectives of sister scholarly disciplines. It is cer-
tainly the case that a shift toward such perspectives is visible across
significantly increasing patches of modern legal scholarship. The fun-
damental question raised by this shift is whether it is a distinctly aca-
37. See Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF CUL-
TURE 19-21, 27-28 (Robert Post ed., 1991).
38. POST, The Relatively Autonomous Discourse of Law, in id., at vii-xvii.
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demic phenomenon, or whether it also implicates other participants in
the practice of law like judges or lawyers. To the extent that the latter
is true, we may be facing a genuine and far-reaching crisis of the legal
system in America. To the extent that the former is true, however, we
may be witnessing instead the slow detachment of legal academics
from the practice of law..
Influenced by the resurgent insights and prestige of various forms
of external scholarship, affected by changing patterns of professional
recruitment and diminishing connections to the professional bar, legal
academia may simply be moving inexorably toward an exogenous
framework for its scholarship. But because most law professors have
refused to cut the umbilical cord to legal practice with the clean preci-
siofi of Dan-Cohen, we have managed to produce merely a smoldering
academic breakdown of internal definition. We increasingly under-
mine the foundations of a' practice that we cannot bring ourselves to
abandon. And we flirt with forms of scholarship whose institutional
implications we cannot bring ourselves to own.
Not surprisingly, we experience the resulting contradictions as a
crisis of identity.
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